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This paper seeks to analyze the prospects for development in a changed international 
context, where globalization has diminished the policy space so essential for countries 
that are latecomers to development. The main theme is that, to use the available policy 
space for development, it is necessary to redesign strategies by introducing correctives 
and to rethink development by incorporating different perspectives, if development is to 
bring about an improvement in the well-being of people. In redesigning strategies, some 
obvious correctives emerge from an understanding of theory and a study of experience 
that recognizes not only the diversity but also the complexity of development. In 
rethinking development, it is imperative to recognize the importance of initial 
conditions, the significance of institutions, the relevance of politics in economics and 
the critical role of good governance. Even if difficult, there is also a clear need to create 
more policy space for national development, by reshaping the rules of the game in the 
world economy and contemplating some governance of globalization. 
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   1
Introduction 
Globalization, which gathered momentum during the last quarter of the twentieth 
century, has created unparalleled opportunities and posed unprecedented challenges for 
development. Yet, the virtual ideology of our times has transformed globalization from 
a descriptive word into a prescriptive word. But the reality that has unfolded so far 
belies the expectations of the ideologues. The exclusion of countries and of people from 
globalization, which is partly attributable to the logic of markets, is a fact of life. Even 
so, there is a strong belief and an influential view that globalization is the road to 
development during the first quarter of the twenty-first century.1 In a volume that seeks 
to think ahead about the future of development economics, development through 
globalization is an appropriate theme. It is even more appropriate, perhaps, with a 
question mark at the end.  
 
The object of this essay is to reflect on development in prospect, not retrospect, situated 
in the wider international context of globalization. In doing so, it shall, of course, 
address the question posed in the title. The main object, however, is to focus on the 
correctives that would have to be introduced and the rethinking that would have to be 
done, given the reality of globalization, if development is to bring about an 
improvement in the living conditions of people, ordinary people. 
 
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section 1 outlines the rationale of globalization 
as a mantra for development, to juxtapose it with conflicting perceptions and complex 
realities. Section 2 examines the constraints on, and the choices for, for latecomers to 
development at the present juncture, given the asymmetrical consequences of 
globalization so far. Section 3 explains the essential meaning and sets out the objectives 
of development to suggest that we need to rethink the focus. Section 4 considers some 
important correctives, learning not only from the past but also from the present, for 
strategies of development. Section 5 argues that some rethinking is essential, from 
different perspectives, to understand and to foster the process of development, 
particularly because thinking about development, in terms of both theory and policy, has 
become narrower with the passage of time. Section 6 explores how the rules of the game 
for the world economy need to be reshaped to create more space for the pursuit of 
national development objectives. Section 7 concludes. 
1  Globalization as a mantra for development 
Recent years have witnessed the formulation of an intellectual rationale for 
globalization that is almost prescriptive. It is perceived as a means of ensuring not only 
                                                 
1 See, for example, Sachs and Warner (1995), who were among the first exponents of this view. This 
prescriptive view of globalization is also set out, at some length, by Bhagwati (2004); Wolf (2004).    2
efficiency and equity but also growth and development in the world economy. The 
analytical foundations of this world view are provided by the neo-liberal model. 
Orthodox neoclassical economics suggests that intervention in markets is inefficient. 
Neo-liberal political economy argues that governments are incapable of intervening 
efficiently. The essence of the neo-liberal model, then, can be stated as follows. First, 
the government should be rolled back wherever possible so that it approximates to the 
ideal of a minimalist state. Second, the market is not only a substitute for the state but 
also the preferred alternative because it performs better. Third, resource allocation and 
resource utilization must be based on market prices which should conform as closely as 
possible to international prices. Fourth, national political objectives, domestic economic 
concerns or even national boundaries should not act as constraints. In this world, 
domestic economic concerns mesh with, or are subsumed in, the maximization of 
international economic welfare and national political objectives melt away in the 
bargain. 
 
The ideologues believe that globalization led to rapid industrialization and economic 
convergence in the world economy during the late nineteenth century. In their view, the 
promise of the emerging global capitalist system was wasted for more than half a 
century, to begin with by three decades of conflict and autarchy that followed the First 
World War and subsequently, for another three decades, by the socialist path and a 
statist worldview. The conclusion drawn is that globalization, now as much as then, 
promises economic prosperity for countries that join the system and economic 
deprivation for countries that do not.2 It needs to be stressed that this prescriptive view 
of globalization is contested and controversial.3 Yet, for those who have this strong 
belief, globalization is the road to development in the first quarter of the twenty-first 
century.4 
 
Interestingly enough, the development experience of the world economy in the last 
quarter of the twentieth century is invoked as supporting evidence, not only by 
advocates but also by critics of this prescription. In caricature form, these conflicting 
perceptions are almost polar opposites of each other. The pro-globalization advocates 
argue that it led to faster growth, that it reduced poverty, and that it brought about a 
decrease in inequality. The anti-globalization critics argue that it led to slower but more 
volatile growth, that it increased poverty in most parts of the world and that there was 
an increase in inequality. Of course, such a broad-brush picture of conflicting 
                                                 
2 See, in particular, Sachs and Warner (1995). For a very different, contrasting, historical perspective on 
globalization and development, see Nayyar (2006). 
3 In an interesting critique, Samuelson (2004) questions the analytical basis and the theoretical 
foundations of this prescriptive view. For a critical perspective on the implications of globalization for 
development, see Stiglitz (2002); Nayyar (2003a); Kaplinsky (2005). See also Soros (1998); Baker et al. 
(1998). 
4  Sachs and Warner (1995); Bhagwati (2004); Wolf (2004).   3
perceptions abstracts from the nuances and the qualifications. But it highlights the 
impasse in a debate that borders on a dialogue of the deaf. 
 
Yet, there is a little dispute about some important dimensions of reality. In conventional 
terms, the world has made enormous economic progress during the second half of the 
twentieth century. Over the past fifty years, world GDP multiplied almost twelve-fold 
while per capita income more than trebled. The growth has been impressive even in the 
developing world, particularly when compared with underdevelopment and stagnation 
in the colonial era during the first half of the twentieth century. But such aggregates 
conceal more than they reveal. In fact, development has been uneven within and 
between countries. The pattern of development has been such that it has led to an 
increase in the economic distance between the industrialized world and much of the 
developing world. It has also led to an increase in the economic distance between the 
newly industrializing countries at one end and the least developed countries at the other. 
At the same time, economic disparities between regions and between people within 
countries have registered a significant increase. 
 
Uneven development is not without consequences for people. Poverty, inequality and 
deprivation persist. And there is poverty everywhere. One-eighth of the people in 
industrial societies are affected by, or live in, poverty. Almost one-third of the people in 
the developing world live in poverty and experience absolute deprivation in so far as 
they cannot meet their basic human needs. As many as 830 million people suffer from 
malnutrition, while 1.2 billion people do not have access to clean water, and 2.7 billion 
people do not have adequate sanitation facilities. More than 250 million children who 
should be in school are not. Nearly 300 million women are not expected to survive to 
the age of 40. And 850 million adults remain illiterate. Most of them are in developing 
countries. But, in a functional sense, the number of illiterate people in industrial 
societies at 100 million is also large.5 
 
In other words, many parts of the world and a significant proportion of its people are 
largely excluded from development. This may be attributable to the logic of markets 
which give to those who have and take away from those who have not, as the process of 
cumulative causation leads to market-driven virtuous or vicious circles. This may be the 
outcome of patterns of development where economic growth is uneven between regions 
and the distribution of its benefits is unequal between people, so that the outcome is 
growing affluence for some combined with persistent poverty for many. This may be 
the consequence of strategies of development as a similar economic performance in the 
aggregate could lead to egalitarian development in one situation and growth which 
bypasses the majority of the people in another situation. 
                                                 
5 The evidence cited in this paragraph is obtained from UNDP, Humam Development Report (various 
issues), and World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization (2004).   4
2  Consequences, constraints, and choices 
In retrospect, it is apparent that globalization has been associated with simultaneous, yet 
asymmetrical, consequences for countries and for people. There is an inclusion for some 
and an exclusion, or marginalization, for many. There is affluence for some and poverty 
for many. There are some winners and many losers. Joan Robinson once said, ‘There is 
only one thing that is worse than being exploited by capitalists. And that is not being 
exploited by capitalists.’ Much the same can be said about markets and globalization 
which may not ensure prosperity for everyone but may, in fact, exclude a significant 
proportion of people. 
 
It would seem that globalization has created two worlds that co-exist in space even if 
they are far apart in wellbeing. For some, in a world more interconnected than ever 
before, globalization has opened door to many benefits. Open economies and open 
societies are conducive to innovation, entrepreneurship and wealth creation. Better 
communications, it is said, have enhanced awareness of rights and identities, just as they 
have enabled social movements to mobilize opinion. For many, the fundamental 
problems of poverty, unemployment and inequality persist. Of course, these problems 
existed even earlier. But globalization may have accentuated exclusion and deprivation, 
for it has dislocated traditional livelihoods and local communities. It also threatens 
environmental sustainability and cultural diversity. Better communications, it is said, 
have enhanced awareness of widening disparities. Everybody sees the world through the 
optic of their lives. Therefore, perceptions about globalization depend on who you are, 
what you do, and where you live. Some focus on the benefits and the opportunities. 
Others focus on the costs and the dangers. Both are right in terms of what they see. But 
both are wrong in terms of what they do not see. 
 
On balance, it is clear that there is exclusion of countries and of people.6 Too many 
people in poor countries, particularly in rural areas or in the informal sector, are 
marginalized if not excluded. Too few share in the benefits. Too many have no voice in 
its design or influence on its course. There is a growing polarization between the 
winners and the losers. The gap between rich and poor countries, between rich and poor 
in the world’s population and between rich and poor people within countries, has 
widened. These mounting imbalances in the world are ethically unacceptable and 
politically unsustainable.7 
 
But that is not all. Globalization has diminished the policy space so essential for 
countries that are latecomers to development. Indeed, the space for, and autonomy to 
formulate policies in the pursuit of national development objectives is significantly 
reduced. This is so for two reasons: unfair rules of the game in the world economy and 
                                                 
6 For a detailed discussion, as also evidence, see Nayyar (2003a; 2006). 
7 This proposition is set out, as also explained, in the Report of the World Commission on the Social 
Dimension of Globalization (2004).    5
consequences of integration into international financial markets. In a world of unequal 
partners, it is not surprising that the rules of the game are asymmetrical in terms of 
construct and inequitable in terms of outcome. The strong have the power to make the 
rules and the authority to implement the rules. In contrast, the weak can neither set nor 
invoke the rules. The problem, however, takes different forms.8 
 
First, there are different rules in different spheres. The rules of the game for the 
international trading system, being progressively set in the WTO, provide the most 
obvious example. There are striking asymmetries. National boundaries should not 
matter for trade flows and capital flows but should be clearly demarcated for technology 
flows and labour flows. It follows that developing countries would provide access to 
their markets without a corresponding access to technology and would accept capital 
mobility without a corresponding provision for labour mobility. This implies more 
openness in some spheres but less openness in other spheres. The contrast between the 
free movement of capital and the unfree movement of labour across national boundaries 
lies at the heart of the inequality in the rules of the game.  
 
Second, there are rules for some but not for others. In the WTO, for instance, major 
trading countries resort to a unilateral exercise of power, ignoring the rules, because 
small countries do not have the economic strength even if they have the legal right to 
retaliate. The conditions imposed by the IMF and the World Bank, however, provide the 
more familiar example. There are no rules for surplus countries, or even deficit 
countries, in the industrialized world, which do not borrow from the multilateral 
financial institutions. But the IMF and the World Bank set rules for borrowers in the 
developing world and in the transition economies. The conditionality is meant in 
principle to ensure repayment, but in practice it imposes conditions to serve the interests 
of international banks which lend to the same countries. The Bretton Woods institutions, 
then, act as watchdogs for moneylenders in international capital markets. This has been 
so for some time. But there is more to it now. IMF programmes of stabilization and 
World Bank programmes of structural adjustment seek to harmonize policies and 
institutions across countries, which is in consonance with the needs of globalization.  
 
Third, the agenda for new rules is partisan, but the unsaid is just as important as the 
said. The attempt to create a multilateral agreement on investment in the WTO, which 
seeks free access and national treatment for foreign investors, with provisions to enforce 
commitments and obligations to foreign investors, provides the most obvious example. 
Surely, these rights of foreign investors must be matched by some obligations. Thus, a 
discipline on restrictive business practices of transnational corporations, the importance 
of conformity with anti-trust laws in home countries, or a level playing field for 
domestic firms in host countries, should also be in the picture. The process of 
globalization is already reducing the autonomy of developing countries in the 
                                                 
8 For a more complete discussion on rules of the game, see Nayyar (2002a; 2003a).   6
formulation of economic policies in their pursuit of development. These unfair rules 
also encroach on the policy space so essential for national development. 
 
The existing (and prospective) rules of the WTO regime allow few exceptions and 
provide little flexibility to countries that are latecomers to industrialization. In 
comparison, there was more room for manoeuvre in the erstwhile GATT, inter alia, 
because of special and differential treatment for developing countries. The new regime 
is much stricter in terms of the law and the implementation. The rules on trade in the 
new regime make the selective protection or strategic promotion of domestic firms vis-
à-vis foreign competition much more difficult. The tight system for the protection of 
intellectual property rights could pre-empt or stifle the development of domestic 
technological capabilities. The possible multilateral agreement on investment, should it 
materialize, would almost certainly reduce the possibilities of strategic bargaining with 
transnational firms. Similarly, commitments on structural reform, an integral part of 
stabilization and adjustment programmes with the IMF and the World Bank, inevitably 
prescribe industrial deregulation, privatization, trade liberalization and financial 
deregulation. In sum, the new regime appears rule-based but the rules are not uniform. 
And it is not clear how or why this is better than discretion. For, taken together, such 
rules and conditions are bound to curb the use of industrial policy, technology policy, 
trade policy and financial policy as strategic forms of intervention to foster 
industrialization.9  
 
At the same time, the consequences of integration into international capital markets also 
reduce degrees of freedom. Exchange rates can no longer be used as a strategic device 
to provide an entry into world markets for manufactured goods, just as the interest rates 
can no longer be used as a strategic instrument for guiding the allocation of scarce 
investible resources in a market economy. What is more, countries that are integrated 
into the international financial system are constrained in using an autonomous 
management of demand to maintain levels of output and employment. Expansionary 
fiscal and monetary policies—large government deficits to stimulate aggregate demand 
or low interest rates to encourage domestic investment—can no longer be used because 
of an overwhelming fear that such measures could lead to speculative capital flight and 
a run on the national currency.10 
 
In sum, the existing global rules encroach upon essential policy space. And the problem 
is compounded by the rapid, sometimes premature, integration into international 
financial markets. Therefore, latecomers to industrialization would find it difficult to 
emulate the East Asian success stories. Indeed, the industrialized countries had much 
                                                 
9 It must be recognized that such state intervention was crucial for development in the success stories 
among late industrializers during the second half of the twentieth century. For a convincing exposition of 
this view, see Amsden (1989); Wade (1990); Chang (1996).  
10 For an analysis of this issue, see Nayyar (2002b).    7
more freedom and space in policy formulation at comparable stages of their 
industrialization.11 There is an obvious question that arises. What are the options or 
choices in this situation for countries that are latecomers to development? First, it is 
essential to use the available policy space for national development, given the 
international context. Second, it is important to create more policy space by reshaping 
the rules of the game in the world economy. In the national context, therefore, it is 
necessary to redesign strategies by introducing correctives, and to rethink development 
by incorporating different perspectives, that would make for egalitarian economic 
development and a more broad-based social development. In the international context, 
even if difficult, it is necessary to reshape the rules of the game and contemplate some 
governance of globalization.  
3  Conception of development 
Before considering these possibilities, it is both necessary and desirable to reflect on the 
essential meaning of development. For this purpose, a short digression is worthwhile. 
The reason is that the agenda on development in terms of both theory and policy has, 
unfortunately, narrowed with the passage of time. So has its meaning and the object of 
its focus. Hence, there is a need to reflect on the meaning and rethink the focus. There is 
a vast literature on economic development which is rich in terms of range and depth. 
Yet, there is not enough clarity about the meaning of development. There are many 
different views. And perspectives have changed over time.  
 
In the early 1950s, conventional thinking identified development with growth in GDP or 
GDP per capita. The earlier literature emphasized economic growth and capital 
accumulation at a macro level. The contemporary literature emphasizes economic 
efficiency and productivity increases at a macro level. Industrialization has always been 
seen as an essential attribute of development. The emphasis has simply shifted from the 
pace of industrialization to the efficiency of industrialization. The underlying 
presumption is that economic growth and economic efficiency are not only necessary 
but also sufficient for bringing about an improvement in the living conditions of people. 
From time to time, dissenting voices question conventional wisdom to suggest other 
indicators of development but these were largely ignored by mainstream economics. 
And, even fifty years later, economic growth or increases in per capita remain the most 
important measure of development. 
 
The early 1970s witnessed the emergence of a literature that suggested other indicators 
of development such as a reduction in poverty, inequality and unemployment which 
would capture changes in the quality of life.12 This thinking moved further. 
Development, it was argued, must bring about an improvement in the living conditions 
                                                 
11 See Bairoch (1993); Chang (2002a); Maddison (1995). 
12 See, for example, Baster (1972); Seers (1972); Morris (1979).   8
of people. It should, therefore, ensure the provision of basic human needs for all—not 
just food and clothing but also shelter, healthcare, and education.13 It was stressed that 
this simple but powerful proposition is often forgotten in the conventional concerns of 
economics. Such thinking culminated in writings on, and an index of, human 
development.14 
 
In the late 1990s, Amartya Sen provided the broadest possible conception of 
development as freedom: a process of expanding real freedoms that people enjoy for 
their economic wellbeing, social opportunities and political rights.15 Such freedoms are 
not just constitutive as the primary ends of development. Such freedoms are also 
instrumental as the principal means of attaining development. What is more, there are 
strong interconnections that link different freedoms with one another. Political freedoms 
help promote economic security. Social opportunities facilitate economic participation. 
Economic wellbeing supports social facilities and reinforces political rights. In this 
manner, freedoms of different kinds strengthen one another. The purpose of 
development, after all, is to create a milieu that enables people, ordinary people, to lead 
a good life. Development must, therefore, provide all men and women the rights, the 
opportunities and the capabilities they need to exercise their own choices for a decent 
life. 
 
The significance of this abstraction about or conceptualization of development is not 
lost on everyone. But it is the tangible or the measurable that remains dominant in terms 
of wide use and popular understanding. Per capita income is only an arithmetic mean. 
Social indicators are also statistical averages. And neither captures the wellbeing of the 
poor. Even the human development index is not quite an exception. The quantifiable is 
obviously important. But it should not shape our thinking about development. In fact, it 
does. Consequently, the focus is misplaced. It needs to be corrected. And the correction 
has several dimensions. It is essential to make a distinction between means and ends. 
Economic growth and economic efficiency, or for that matter industrialization, are 
means. It is development which is an end. Much of the focus in the literature on 
development is on economies. But aggregates often conceal more than they reveal. 
Thus, it is important to shift the focus from countries to people. However, people are not 
just beneficiaries. It is only if people are centre-stage in the process of development, as 
the main actors, that development can empower people to participate in the decisions 
that shape their lives. The significance of this proposition is highlighted by the medieval 
distinction between agents and patients, which is invoked by Sen. He argues that the 
freedom-centred understanding of economics and of the process of development is very 
                                                 
13 See Streeten (1981); Stewart (1985). 
14 There is an extensive literature on the subject. For a discussion on the conceptual foundations, see Sen 
(1989) and Haq (1995). For an analysis of issues related to methodology and measurement, see Anand 
and Sen (1994).  
15 See Sen (1999).   9
much an agent-oriented view. This is because individuals with adequate social 
opportunities can effectively shape their own destiny and help each other. They must 
not be seen primarily as patients, or passive recipients, of the benefits of cunning 
development programmes.16 
4  Redesigning strategies: introducing correctives 
The introduction of correctives in the design of strategies for development is easier said 
than done. Even so, some essential correctives emerge from an understanding of theory 
and a study of experience that recognizes not only the diversity but also the complexity 
of development. In this reflection, it is necessary to recognize the limitations of 
orthodox economic theory and policy prescriptions even if these represent influential 
thinking about development at the present juncture. It is just as necessary to learn 
lessons from the history of development experience embedded in both successes and 
failures without neglecting specificities in time and space.  
 
The first limitation of orthodoxy is its unquestioned faith in the market mechanism. It 
fails to recognize that there is no magic in the market. Indeed, market failures are not 
quite an exception but are closer to being the rule. The strong belief in the market 
mechanism is based on the proposition that market forces, or the invisible hand, achieve 
a competitive equilibrium. The fundamental theorems of welfare economics establish 
that this is an efficient state and a desirable state.17 In spite of analytical elegance of 
these theorems, such faith is not quite warranted. The scepticism extends much beyond 
the critics. Consider, for example, the following quotations from three distinguished 
economic theorists: Frank Hahn, Amartya Sen and Joseph Stiglitz. 
 
It showed that it is logically possible to describe a world where greedy 
and rational people responding only to price signals take actions which 
are mutually compatible. The theory does not describe the invisible hand 
in motion but displays it with its task accomplished…The importance of 
this intellectual achievement is that it provides a benchmark…Now one 
of the mysteries which future historians of thought will surely wish to 
unravel is how it came about that the Arrow-Debreu model came to be 
taken descriptively; that is as sufficient in itself for the study and control 
of actual economies. (Hahn 1984: 308). 
 
The intellectual climate has changed quite dramatically over the last few 
decades, and the tables are now turned. The virtues of the market 
mechanism are now standardly assumed to be so pervasive that 
qualifications seem unimportant … The need for critical scrutiny of 
                                                 
16 For a lucid analysis, see Sen (1999).  
17 For a detailed examination of the fundamental theorems of welfare economics, see Arrow (1950).    10
standard preconceptions and politico-economic attitudes has never been 
stronger. Today’s prejudices (in favour of the pure market mechanism) 
need to be investigated and, I would argue, partly rejected. (Sen 1999: 
111-12). 
 
… the reason the invisible hand is invisible is partly because it’s simply 
not there.18  
 
There are, in fact, many reasons why these results, which highlight the virtues of the 
market, may not hold.19 First, there may be externalities in production or consumption 
which would lead to market failure. The original solution to this problem was 
appropriate taxes and subsidies to be introduced by the government. But this went out of 
fashion with the Coase Theorem, which returned the market to its pedestal.20 Second, in 
such a world, markets may not deliver efficient and desirable outcomes if transaction 
costs are too high or if there is no government that can assign and protect property 
rights. Third, markets may not function, as textbooks would have us believe, in 
situations where an enforcement of contracts is difficult or not possible. And this is a 
common occurrence in developing countries which are significantly different from 
industrial societies in this sphere. Fourth, markets may cease to function as expected if 
there is an uncertainty about quality. In other words, doing business in markets is 
difficult where goods or services are of poor quality and where quality cannot be 
discerned by consumers before purchase.21 Fifth, it would seem that the market 
mechanism needs support to function as it is meant to. The need for such support spans 
a wide range from taxes-cum-subsidies in the presence of externalities, and laws to 
enforce contracts or property rights, to certification and regulation in a world of 
asymmetric information. Even with such support, markets are prone to corrupt practices 
whenever agents engaged by institutions to enforce regulations or laws are more 
interested in their own welfare rather than in achieving the goals set for them by 
institutions established to regulate markets.22 
 
The second limitation of orthodoxy is the belief that getting-prices-right is enough. Such 
thinking makes an elementary, but commonplace, error in the design of policies. It 
confuses  comparison (of equilibrium positions) with change (from one equilibrium 
position to another). In the real world, economic policy must be concerned not merely 
with comparison but with how to direct the process of change. Thus, for example, even 
                                                 
18 Joseph Stiglitz during interview on WBAI Radio, 15 August 2002, New York. 
19 For a succinct discussion on why these results may not hold, see Mukherji (2005).  
20 See Coase (1960). It is worth noting that Richard Coase was awarded the Nobel Prize in Economics, 
for this contribution, in 1991. 
21 This proposition was developed by Akerlof (1970) in a seminal contribution.  
22 See, for instance, Banerjee (1997).    11
if a reduction in protection can, in principle, lead to a more cost-efficient economy the 
transition path is by no means clear. And the process of change should not be confused 
with the ultimate destination of an economy that is competitive in the world market.23 
 
The third limitation of orthodoxy is the presumption that policy regimes which are 
necessary are also sufficient.24 The management of incentives motivated by the object 
of minimizing costs and maximizing efficiency at a micro level is based on a set of 
policies that is intended to increase competition between firms in the market place. 
Domestic competition is sought to be provided through deregulation in investment 
decisions, in the financial sector and in labour markets. Foreign competition is sought to 
be provided through openness in trade, investment and technology flows. It must, 
however, be recognized that there is nothing automatic about competition. Policy 
regimes can allow things to happen but cannot cause things to happen. The creation of 
competitive markets that enforce efficiency may, in fact, require strategic intervention 
through industrial policy, trade policy and financial policy, just as it may require the 
creation of institutions.  
 
The fourth limitation of orthodoxy is its stress on government failures and its neglect of 
market failures. However, both market failure and government failure are facts of life. 
For neither markets nor governments are, or can ever be, perfect. Indeed, markets are 
invariably imperfect and governments are without exception fallible. The juxtaposition 
of government failure and market failure in an either-or mode, as if there was a choice 
to be made, is misleading. It is important to introduce correctives against both market 
failure and government failure. In such a perspective, the state and the market are 
complements rather than substitutes. What is more, the relationship between the state 
and the market cannot be defined once-and-for-all in any dogmatic manner but must 
change over time in an adaptive manner as circumstances change.25 In this context, it is 
important to remember that markets are good servants but bad masters. What is more, 
efficient markets need effective states. 
 
Development experience during the second half of the twentieth century also suggests 
important correctives for redesigning strategies. There are some important lessons that 
can be learnt from mistakes and failures of the past.26 The first lesson to emerge from 
experience is that competition in the market is desirable. Such competition is essential 
between domestic firms, between domestic firms and foreign firms, as also between the 
public sector and the private sector. Industrial deregulation that removes barriers to 
entry for new firms and limits on the growth in the existing firms leads to competition 
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between domestic firms. Trade liberalization which reduces restrictions or tariffs on 
imports leads to competition between domestic and foreign firms. The dismantling of 
public sector monopolies leads to competition between the public sector and the private 
sector. It is such competition between firms, in price and in quality, that creates 
efficiency among producers and provides a choice for consumers.  
 
The second lesson to emerge from experience is that prudent macro management of the 
economy is both necessary and desirable. Soft options, such as borrowing by the 
government only postpone the day of reckoning. Borrowing to support consumption 
almost always leads to a fiscal crisis. The problem may be compounded by a reliance on 
external resources to finance development. And if such borrowing is used to support 
consumption, a debt crisis is almost inevitable. Even so, it is necessary to recognize the 
fallacies of deficit fetishism. It must be stressed that the size of the fiscal deficit or the 
amount of borrowings are symptoms and not the disease. The real issue is the use to 
which the government borrowing is put in relation to the cost of borrowing by the 
government. Thus, government borrowing is always sustainable if it is used to finance 
investment and if the rate of return on such investment is greater than the interest rate 
payable. 
 
The third lesson to emerge from experience is that excessive and inappropriate state 
intervention is counter-productive. It is, of course, important to learn from mistakes but 
it is just as important to avoid over-correction in learning from mistakes, because there 
are dangers implicit in over-reaction. Clearly, there are things that markets can and 
should do. However, there are some things that only governments can do. If 
governments do these badly, it is not possible to dispense with governments or replace 
them with markets. Governments must be made to perform better. It is, therefore, 
necessary to reformulate the questions about the economic role of the state.27 The real 
question is no longer about the size of the state (how big?) or the degree of state 
intervention (how much?). The question is now about the nature of state intervention 
(what sort?) and the quality of the performance of the state (how good?). 
 
The fourth lesson to emerge from experience, in the more recent past, is that the speed 
and the sequence of change matter. For one, the speed of change must be calibrated so 
that it can be absorbed by the economy. For another, the sequence of change must be 
planned with reference to an order of priorities. The significance of speed and sequence 
emerges clearly in the sphere of trade policy reform and even more clearly from the 
experience with capital account liberalization. In both, whether speed or sequence, 
deregulation and openness must be compatible with initial conditions and must be 
consistent with each other.  
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Clearly, it is important to learn from failures. Recognition of where things went wrong 
translates easily into correctives. But it is just as important to learn from successes. And 
there are two important lessons that emerge from development experience in countries 
that are success stories. First, there are specificities in time and space which must be 
recognized and cannot be ignored. Obviously, one-size does not fit all. Second, 
latecomers to industrialization during the twentieth century, to begin with in Europe, 
and subsequently in Asia, that succeeded adopted strategies of development which not 
only varied across countries over time but also differed significantly from orthodox 
policy prescriptions now in fashion.28  
 
Last but not least, there are some forgotten essentials that should form an integral part of 
any attempt at redesigning strategies of development. First, it is not quite recognized 
that economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to bring about a reduction in 
poverty. It cannot suffice to say that the outcomes of economic policies should be 
moderated by social policies. The dichotomy between economic and social policies is 
inadequate just as the dichotomy between economic and social development is 
inappropriate. In fact, no such distinction is made in industrialized countries. And the 
experience of industrialized world suggests that there is a clear need for an integration, 
rather than separation, of economic and social policies. Thus, it is important to create 
institutional mechanisms that mediate between economic growth and social 
development.  
 
Second, it is often forgotten that the wellbeing of humankind is the essence of 
development. Thus, distributional outcomes are important. So are employment and 
livelihoods. Structural reforms associated with economic liberalization have important 
implications for employment creation and income opportunities. For one, in so far as 
such reforms increase the average productivity of labour, through the use of capital-
intensive or labour-saving technologies, or through a restructuring of firms, which 
increases efficiency, it reduces the contribution of any given rate of economic growth to 
employment growth. For another, in so far as trade liberalization enforces closures 
rather than efficiency at a micro level, or switches demand away from home-produced 
goods to foreign goods at a macro level, it has an adverse effect on output, hence 
employment, which is magnified through the multiplier effect. This has important 
consequences in the medium term. There is a contraction of employment in some 
sectors without a compensatory expansion of employment in other sectors. And, as 
employment elasticities of output decline, employment creation slows down. It need 
hardly be stressed that employment creation is the only sustainable means of reducing 
poverty. Moreover, employment is also essential for the wellbeing and dignity of 
people. 
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5  Rethinking development: different perspectives 
The discourse on theory and policy in development has become narrower with the 
passing of time. Some rethinking on development is essential. It must incorporate 
different perspectives. A systematic, let alone complete, analysis of such alternatives 
would mean too much of a digression. Even so, it is necessary to stress the following as 
an integral part of any rethinking on development: the importance of initial conditions, 
the significance of institutions, the relevance of politics in economics and the critical 
role of good governance. 
 
It is obvious that initial conditions are important determinants of development. It should 
also be recognized that initial conditions can and should be changed to foster 
development. This is an unambiguous lesson that emerges from economic history.29 In 
countries that are latecomers to industrialization, state intervention creates conditions 
for the development of industrial capitalism through the spread of education in society, 
the creation of a physical infrastructure and the introduction of institutional change. 
This role has always been recognized. The building of managerial capabilities in 
individuals and technological capabilities in firms is also an important, even if less 
recognized, dimension of initial conditions, for such capabilities determine technical 
efficiency in the short run and competitiveness in the long run. This has been 
recognized for some time. The present juncture, however, is characterized by a 
widespread disillusionment with the economic role of the state and a strong belief in the 
magic of the market. Hence, orthodoxy neglects the importance of initial conditions. 
There is an irony in this situation. In the context of globalization, such a role for the 
state is more necessary than ever before. Indeed, creating the initial conditions is 
essential for maximizing the benefits and minimizing the costs of integration with the 
world economy. 
 
The debate on development is, in large part, about policies. The time has come to move 
beyond policies to institutions. The recent recognition of the importance of institutions, 
even if late, is welcome.30 Yet, the understanding of institutions in the profession of 
economics is, to say the least, limited. Economists have treated institutions as a black 
box in much the same way as they treated technology for some time. What is more, 
orthodox economics has sought to harmonize the role as also the form of institutions 
across the world irrespective of space and time. This is a serious mistake, since one-size 
does not fit all. There are specificities in space. Institutions are local and cannot be 
transplanted out of context. There are specificities in time. Institutions need time to 
evolve and cannot be created by a magic wand. The blueprints for economic 
liberalization over the past 25 years have simply not recognized this reality. 
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The meaning of institutions is not always clear. At one level, institutions refer to the 
rules of the game. These rules can be formal, as in constitutions, laws or statutes. These 
rules can also be informal, as in norms, conventions or practices. At another level, 
institutions refer to organizations or entities that are not players. The role of the state is 
crucial in almost every dimension of institutions. In an economy, the state seeks to 
govern the market through rules or laws. It does so by setting rules of the game for 
players in the market. In particular, it creates frameworks for regulating markets. But it 
also creates institutions, whether organizations or entities, to monitor the functioning of 
markets. The development of such institutions, which cannot always develop on their 
own, may need some pro-active for the state, as catalyst if not leader. Of course, there 
are institutions that may develop through markets, as in standards or for safety, but these 
depend on social norms. 
 
In a market economy, social norms are perhaps as important as laws or organizations in 
the world of institutions.31 Clearly, there is a world beyond ‘methodological 
individualism’ which reduces all social and economic interaction simply to the self-
interest of the individual. This proposition is nicely illustrated by Adam Smith’s 
intellectual journey from the Theory of Moral Sentiments to the Wealth of Nations. The 
notion of society came to be embedded in a wider range of human moral sentiments. 
This was Smith’s composite notion of ‘sympathy’. Such sympathy was not just altruism. 
It was a complex range of co-existing, often conflicting, human motives that culminated 
in social norms such as trust in exchange, respect for contracts or reciprocity in 
behaviour. Some of these may also have been the outcome of longer term enlightened 
self-interest. In this world, exchange and production in markets is sustained by 
underlying, unwritten, social norms. Indeed, without such social norms, no market 
economy can function. Unfortunately, social norms, so essential for institutions, are no 
longer part of conventional  academic discourse, which exaggerates the efficiency of an 
abstract market mechanism based on an invented auctioneer and neglects the role of the 
state in preserving or reinforcing these norms.  
 
The literature does not make any clear distinction between forms and functions of 
institutions. There is, also, little understanding of processes of change in existing 
institutions or in evolution of new institutions. Much remains to be done so as to 
improve understanding of institutions and of institutional change in the process of 
development, which could be the difference between success and failure at 
development. Such understanding needs not only theory but also history. However, the 
theory must be non-ideological just as the history must be non-selective. 
 
In every society, economy and polity are closely intertwined. It is the interaction of 
economics and politics which shapes outcome for people. Therefore, it is essential to 
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explore the interplay between economics and politics in the process of development.32 
There is, then, need for a political economy that extends beyond econometric analysis at 
a micro level, even if it is the fashion of our times. This is easier said than done. But a 
beginning could be made by exploring the relationship between markets and democracy, 
democracy and development, and development and empowerment. 
 
The essence of the tension between the economics of markets and politics of democracy 
must be recognized. In a market economy, people vote with their money in the market 
place. But a political democracy works on the basis of one-person-one-vote. The 
distribution of votes, unlike the distribution of incomes or assets, is equal. One adult has 
one vote in politics even though a rich man has more votes than a poor man, in terms of 
purchasing power, in the market. This tension may be compounded by a related 
asymmetry between economy and polity. The people who are excluded by the 
economics of markets are included by the politics of democracy. The rich dominate a 
market economy in terms of purchasing power. But the poor have a strong voice in a 
political democracy in terms of votes. Hence, exclusion and inclusion are asymmetrical 
in economics and politics. In reconciling the market economy and political democracy, 
successive generations of economic thinkers and political philosophers have stressed the 
role of the state in this process of mediation. The reason is important even if it is not 
obvious. Governments are accountable to their people whereas markets are not. In a 
democracy, however, governments are elected by the people. But even where they are 
not, the state needs legitimation from the people most of whom are not rich or are 
poor.33 
 
The relationship between democracy and development is also complex. But it is 
important to reject the view that latecomers to development cannot afford the luxury of 
democracy. Indeed, thinking ahead, it is clear that democracy is going to be conducive 
to the process of development. The reason is straightforward. The essential attributes of 
democracy, transparency and accountability, provide the means for combining sensible 
economics with feasible politics.34 The economic priorities of the people will be 
reflected more and more in the political agenda of parties if there is a transparency in 
the system. The agenda of political parties will be reflected more and more in the reality 
of economic development if there is accountability in the system. Once this two-way 
process gathers momentum, transparency and accountability will create a commitment 
to long-term objectives of development in the context of a political democracy where 
governments are bound to change through elections over time.  
 
The problem is that democracy, while conducive and necessary, is not sufficient to 
actually produce development. We know that from experience. Development may or 
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may not be provided from above by benevolent governments. It must be claimed from 
below by people as citizens from governments that are accountable. The empowerment 
of people, then, is an integral part of any process of change that leads to development. A 
political democracy, even if it is slow, provides a sure path for two reasons. It increases 
political consciousness among voters to judge political parties for their performance. At 
the same time, it increases participation in the political process when it leads to 
mobilization on some issues. This highlights the significance of Sen’s conception of 
development as freedom. Expanding freedoms for people at large constitute 
development. But the same expanding freedoms, which empower people, are 
instruments that drive the process of change in development.  
 
Governance is critical in the process of development. The real issue is not about more or 
less government. It is about the quality of government performance. This has two 
dimensions. The first dimension is more obvious. It is about redefining the economic 
role of the state in a changed national and international context. In the earlier stages of 
development, the primary role is to create initial conditions. In the later stages of 
development, the role is neither that of a promoter nor that of a catalyst. It is somewhat 
different and spans a range: functional intervention to correct for market failure, 
institutional intervention to govern the market, or the strategic intervention to guide the 
market.35  In this era of markets and globalization, surprisingly enough, the role of the 
state is more critical than ever before and extends beyond correcting for market failures 
or regulating domestic markets. It is about creating the initial conditions to capture the 
benefits from globalization, about managing the process of integration into the world 
economy in terms of pace and sequence, about providing social protection and 
safeguarding the vulnerable in the process of change and about ensuring that economic 
growth creates employment and livelihoods for people.36 In sum, governments need to 
regulate and complement markets so as to make them people-friendly. Thus, the role of 
the state in the process of development will continue to be made for some time to come, 
even as the scope of the market increases through liberalization in the wider context of 
globalization.  
 
The second dimension, good governance, is less obvious. It is, however, more concrete 
and less abstract. Governance is largely about rules and institutions that regulate the 
public realm in civil society. A democratic system seeks to provide for equal 
participation of the rich and the poor, or the strong and the weak, individuals as citizens 
in political processes. And good governance is a process characterized by 
communication and consultation, through which disputes are resolved, consensus is 
built and performance is reviewed on a continuous basis. The basis for good governance 
is a democratic political system that ensures representative and honest governments 
responsive to the needs of people. This involves more than simply free and fair 
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elections. It implies a respect for economic, social and political rights of citizens. The 
rule of law is a foundation. An equitable legal framework, applied consistently to 
everyone, defends people from the abuse of power by state and non-state actors. It 
empowers people to assert their rights. The need for good governance extends to 
economic, social and political institutions required for the functioning of market 
economy and political democracy. A vibrant civil society, empowered by freedom of 
association and expression which can voice diversity in views, is just as important for 
good governance in so far as it provides checks and balances when governments do not 
act as they should. In sum, good governance, where governments are accountable to 
citizens and people are centre-stage in the process of development, is essential for 
creating capabilities, providing opportunities and ensuring rights for ordinary people. 
Governance capabilities matter. Indeed, the quality of governance is an important 
determinant of success or failure at development.37 The moral of the story is not less 
government but good governance.  
6  International context: governing globalization 
It is clear that, during the first quarter of the twenty-first century, development 
outcomes would be shaped, at least in part, by the international context. It is also clear 
that unfair rules of the game in the contemporary world economy would encroach on 
policy space so essential for development. This situation needs to be corrected. The 
correctives should endeavour to make existing rules less unfair, introduce new rules 
where necessary and recognize that even fair rules may not suffice. But this endeavour 
cannot succeed without more democratic structures of governance in the world 
economy. In this process, interestingly enough, the role of nation states would be 
critical. In reshaping unfair rules, it need hardly be said that the nature of the solution 
depends upon the nature of the problem. Where there are different rules in different 
spheres, it is necessary to make the rules symmetrical across spheres. Where there are 
rules for some but not for others, it is necessary to ensure that the rules are uniformly 
applicable to all. Where the agenda for new rules is partisan, it is imperative to redress 
the balance in the agenda.38   
 
There is a clear need for greater symmetry in the rules of multilateral trading system 
embodied in the WTO. If developing countries provide access to their markets, it should 
be matched with some corresponding access to technology. If there is almost complete 
freedom for capital mobility, the draconian restrictions on labour mobility should at 
least be reduced. The enforcement of rules is also asymmetrical. In the Bretton Woods 
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institutions, enforcement is possible through conditionality. Such conditionality, 
however, is applicable only to developing countries or transition economies that borrow 
from the IMF or the World Bank. In the WTO, enforcement is possible through 
retaliation. But most developing countries do not have the economic strength, even if 
they have the legal right, to retaliate. The reality, then, is that the countries that are poor 
or weak conform to the rules, whereas countries that are rich or strong can flout the 
rules. And the hegemonic powers, often, simply ignore the rules. The enforcement of 
rules for the rich and the powerful is, therefore, essential. In addition, the agenda for the 
new rules needs careful scrutiny for it is shaped by the interests of industrialized 
countries while the needs of development are largely neglected. For instance, if the 
proposed multilateral agreement on investment is so concerned about the rights of 
transnational corporations, some attention should also be paid to their possible 
obligations. In any case, such an agreement should not be lodged in the WTO. The issue 
of labour standards, of course, is simply not in the domain of the WTO.  
 
But that is not all. There are some spheres where there are no rules, such as international 
financial markets or cross-border movements of people, which are not even on the 
agenda. The time has come to introduce some rules that govern speculative financial 
flows constituted mostly by short-term capital movements, sensitive to exchange rates 
and interest rates, in search of capital gains. It is also perhaps necessary to think about a 
new international financial architecture in which a World Financial Authority would 
manage systemic risk associated with international financial liberalization, co-ordinate 
national action against market-failure or abuse, and act as a regulator in international 
financial markets.39 Similarly, it is worth contemplating a multilateral framework for 
consular practices and immigration laws that would govern cross-border movements of 
people, akin to multilateral frameworks that exist, or are sought to be created, for the 
governance of national laws, or rules, about the movement of goods, services, 
technology, investment and information across national boundaries.40 The essential 
object should be to create a transparent and non-discriminatory system, based on rules 
rather than discretion, for people who wish to move, temporarily or permanently, across 
borders. 
 
Rules that are fair are necessary but not sufficient. For a game is not simply about rules. 
It is also about players. And if one of the teams or one of the players does not have 
adequate training or preparation, it will simply be crushed by the other. In other words, 
the rules must be such that newcomers or latecomers to the game, for example 
developing countries, are provided with the time and the space to learn so that they can 
become competitive players rather than push-over opponents. In this context, it is 
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important to stress that, for countries at vastly different levels of development, there 
should be some flexibility, instead of complete rigidity, in the application of uniform 
rules. Indeed, uniform rules for unequal partners can only produce unequal outcomes. 
Thus, we should be concerned with the desirability of the outcomes and not with the 
procedural uniformity of rules. It is, in principle, possible to formulate general rules 
where application is a function of country-specific or time-specific circumstances, 
without resorting to exceptions. It implies a set of multilateral rules in which every 
country has the same rights but the obligations are a function of its level or stage of 
development. In other words, rights and obligations should not be strictly symmetrical 
across countries. And there is a clear need for positive discrimination or affirmative 
action in favour of countries that are latecomers to development. 
 
The reshaping of rules is easier said than done. Much would depend upon structures of 
governance. The existing arrangements for global governance are characterized by a 
large democratic deficit.41  In terms of representation, the existing system is less than 
democratic. For one thing, representation is unequal, in part because of unequal weights 
in representation in institutions such as the IMF and the World Bank, and in part 
because of exclusion from representation in arrangements such as the P5 or the G7 or 
even the OECD. For another, representation is incomplete in so far as it is confined 
mostly to governments, with little that could be described as participation by civil 
society or corporate entities, let alone people or citizens. In terms of decision making, 
the existing system is even less democratic. Where some countries have more votes than 
others and yet other countries have no votes, the system is obviously undemocratic. 
Even the principle of one-country-one-vote, however, does not ensure a democratic 
mode. Much also depends on how decisions are made. The right of veto in the Security 
Council of the UN is explicitly undemocratic. But decision making by consensus, as in 
the WTO, can also be undemocratic if there is bilateral arm twisting or a consensus is 
hammered out among a small sub-set of powerful players, while most countries are 
silent spectators that are in the end a part of the apparent consensus. 
 
It is difficult to imagine more democratic structures of governance in a world of such 
disparities, economic and political, between countries. But democracy is not simply 
about majority rule. It is as much about the protection of rights of minorities. The 
essential corrective, then, is to create institutional mechanisms that give poor countries 
and poor people a voice in the process of global governance. Even if they cannot shape 
decisions, they have a right to be heard. In addition, wherever existing rules constrain 
autonomy or choices in the pursuit of development, there is a need for the equivalent of 
an escape clause. Such a provision to opt out of obligations embedded in international 
rules, without having to forsake rights, could provide countries that are latecomers to 
development with the requisite degrees of freedom in their national pursuit of 
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development objectives. It is important to recognize that, in democratic situations, exit 
has as much significance as voice.  
 
In the international context, where the distribution of economic and political power is so 
unequal, the nation state is, perhaps, the only institutional medium through which poor 
countries or poor people can attempt to influence or shape rules and institutions in a 
world of unequal partners. This is because only nation states have the authority to set 
international rules. Groups of countries with mutual interests are more likely to be heard 
than single countries by themselves. There will always be some conflict of interest but 
there will always be areas where it is possible to find common cause and accept trade-
offs. In principle, it is possible to contemplate co-operation among nation states to 
create rules and norms for the market that transcend national boundaries, just as the 
nation state created rules and norms for the market within national boundaries. In 
practice, however, a recognition of the benefits of such co-operation might not be 
motivation enough. Co-operation among nation states is far more likely to materialize, 
much like stable coalitions, if and when the costs of non-co-operation cross the 
threshold of tolerance. In either case, the nation state is the most important player in the 
game. Therefore, it is not possible to imagine good governance in the world without 
nation states, just as it is not possible to have good governance in countries without 
governments. 
7 Conclusion 
In considering the prospects for development during the first quarter of the twenty-first 
century, it is time to reflect on a new agenda for development. In this reflection, the 
concern for efficiency must be balanced with a concern for equity, just as the concern 
for economic growth must be balanced with a concern for social progress. It is also time 
to evolve a new consensus on development, in which the focus is on people rather than 
economies. Such a consensus must be built on a sense of proportion which does not re-
open old ideological battles in terms of either-or choices, and on a depth of 
understanding which recognizes the complexity and the diversity of development. This 
thinking should not be limited to the sphere of economics. It must extend to the realm of 
politics. For substantive democracy, which creates a political accountability of 
governments to the people, must be an integral part of the new agenda for, and the new 
consensus on development. In such a world, ensuring decent living conditions for 
people, ordinary people, would naturally emerge as a fundamental objective. 
Development must, therefore, provide all men and women the rights, the opportunities 
and the capabilities to expand their freedoms and exercise their own choices for their 
wellbeing. In this process, people would be participants rather than beneficiaries. The 
distinction between ends and means would remain critical. And, in the pursuit of 
development, the importance of public action cannot be stressed enough. It must be an 
integral part of development strategies, which should not be forgotten in the enthusiasm 
for markets and globalization.   22
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